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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Re: Electronic Filing Pilot Program - Court of Common 
Pleas 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the South Carolina 
Constitution, 
 
IT IS ORDERED that a Pilot Program is established for the Electronic Filing (E-
Filing) of documents in the Court of Common Pleas beginning December 9, 2015, 
in Clarendon County. In order for the E-Filing System to be implemented 
uniformly and effectively, all filings in all common pleas cases commenced or 
pending in Clarendon County after the effective date of the Pilot Program must be 
E-Filed if the party is represented by an attorney, unless the type of case or the type 
of filing is excluded from the Pilot Program.   
 
Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic Filing Policies and 
Guidelines, which were adopted by the Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and 
the training materials available at http://www.sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine 
whether any specific filings are exempted from the requirement that they be E-
Filed. 
 
The Pilot Program will be expanded to other counties pursuant to future Orders of 
the Court. 
                 s/Jean Hoefer Toal   
 Chief Justice of South Carolina 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
December 1, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Diane Bass and Otis Bass, Individually and as Parents 
and Guardians of Alex B., a minor under the age of ten 
(10) years, and Hanna B., a minor under the age of ten 
(10) years, Petitioners,
 
v. 
 
South Carolina Department of Social Services, 
Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001332 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From Fairfield County 
R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court Judge  
Opinion No. 27593 

Heard March 17, 2015 – Filed December 2, 2015 

REVERSED 
Lee Deer Cope, of Peters Murdaugh Parker Eltzroth & 
Detrick, PA, of Hampton; John K. Koon and Jamie L. 
Walters, of Koon & Cook, PA, of Columbia, all for 
Petitioners. 
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Patrick John Frawley, of Davis Frawley, LLC, of 
Lexington, for Respondent. 
CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: Diane and Otis Bass, individually and on behalf of 
their minor children (collectively, Petitioners), appeal the court of appeals' decision 
reversing a jury verdict in their favor against the South Carolina Department of 
Social Services (DSS) for gross negligence and outrage in connection with a DSS 
investigation.  See Bass v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 403 S.C. 184, 742 S.E.2d 667 
(Ct. App. 2013). We reverse.     
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Diane and Otis Bass are married and have three children: Brittany, Hanna, 
and Alex. All three children have special needs, but Hanna and Alex are also 
autistic. Otis works outside the home, and Diane cares for the children.   
Due to their forms of autism and their other cognitive issues, both Hanna 
and Alex were prescribed Clonidine to help them sleep at night, in addition to other 
medications. A compounding pharmacy filled the Clonidine prescription.  In April 
2008, the prescription was inadvertently mixed at one thousand times the 
recommended concentration.   
On the evening of May 11, 2008, Diane administered the wrongly 
compounded Clonidine to Hanna.  During her bath that evening, Hanna "went 
blank," "[h]er eyes turned around in the back of her head, and her skin turned 
cold." Diane took Hanna to Fairfield Memorial Hospital, but she was not admitted.  
Two days later, Hanna became lethargic, so Diane took her to their family doctor.  
At that time, the family doctor sent Hanna to Palmetto Richland Memorial Hospital 
(Richland Memorial) in Columbia due to his concern over Hanna's lethargy and 
respiratory issues, and Hanna was admitted.   
On May 15, Alex became ill after taking the Clonidine.  Diane took him to 
the family doctor.  The nurse practitioner on call testified that Alex was very ill 
upon arrival.  Alex was transported via ambulance to Fairfield Memorial Hospital, 
and then via helicopter to Richland Memorial and placed on life support.   
13 

  
 
 
  
  
                                        
 
 
That same day, DSS received a report that two special needs children were 
in the hospital due to "possible poisoning by parents."  The agency assigned an 
overall danger rating of "medium" to the case because while Hanna and Alex were 
very young—seven and three at the time, respectively—they were not in imminent 
danger while they were in the hospital.  Nonetheless, the "medium" danger rating 
mandated that a DSS employee respond to the report and initiate an investigation 
within twenty-four hours. Caseworker Monique Parrish arrived at the hospital 
within forty-five minutes after DSS received the report.
At the hospital, Parrish spoke to Otis, who "had no idea what was going on."  
She also questioned the oldest child, Brittany, who told Parrish that Diane "poured 
medicine in soda and gave it to Alex and Hanna," and that they became ill shortly 
thereafter. Moreover, the hospital staff speculated to Parrish that the children had 
been overly medicated. Parrish took the bottle of medicine, but did not arrange to 
have it tested and did not otherwise investigate its contents.  After observing 
Hanna and Alex, Parrish asked Diane and Otis to meet her at the DSS office the 
next morning. 
On May 16, after a family meeting with Diane, her sisters, and her niece, 
Parrish determined the children should be removed from the Bass home and placed
with Diane's sister, Linda.1  Diane and Otis signed a safety plan to this effect,2 and 
1 Prior to this placement, Parrish performed the requisite home visit and 
background check. However, Parrish did not investigate whether Linda could 
address the children's special care requirements, instead relying on Diane's 
assurances that Linda was capable of addressing the children's basic needs. 
2 At trial, it was heavily disputed whether Diane and Otis voluntarily signed the 
safety plan. Some of the testimony indicated that Parrish informed Diane and Otis 
that their children would be separated and placed in foster care if DSS could not 
achieve placement with a relative.  However, DSS's expert testified that Diane and 
Otis could have refused to sign the safety plan, at which time DSS would have 
been required to seek a court order to place the children.   
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Linda took custody of the three children.3  Diane and Otis were permitted to visit 
the children "whenever they wanted" so long as Linda was present during the visit.   
On May 20, in compliance with DSS policy, Parrish held a five-day staff 
meeting with other DSS employees, during which they determined that Diane and 
Otis were unfit parents. 
On June 17, Linda received a telephone call from the compounding 
pharmacy's insurer concerning the improperly filled Clonidine prescription.  Linda 
notified DSS, and the agency subsequently concluded that the medication was the 
cause of the children's hospitalization.  This revelation led to the eventual return of 
the children to Diane and Otis. However, DSS continued to make announced and 
unannounced visits at the Bass home through the end of 2008 and still refuses to 
remove its finding that Diane and Otis "harmed their children" from the agency's 
file on Petitioners.
Petitioners filed a lawsuit against DSS, the compounding pharmacy, and the 
pharmacist, alleging negligence and gross negligence, and seeking actual and 
punitive damages. In May 2011, after settling with the pharmacy and the 
pharmacist, Petitioners served DSS with an amended complaint.  In their amended 
complaint, Petitioners alleged causes of action for gross negligence, defamation, 
and outrage, and sought actual damages.  In its answer, in addition to a general 
denial, DSS asserted affirmative defenses under the South Carolina Tort Claims
Act (the TCA),4 as well as the affirmative defenses of comparative negligence, 
negligence of a third party, legal privilege and justification, qualified privilege, and 
with respect to the defamation and outrage causes of action, failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. 
3 Linda testified that she understood the placement to be temporary, but she 
testified that DSS never attempted to return the children to their parents, even after  
she inquired about alternative placement due to Alex's and Hanna's special needs 
and the stress incumbent upon their care.  Instead, Hanna was placed with another 
relative. 
4 See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-30(f) (Supp. 2014) (defining "loss" and failing to 
include "outrage" as method of recovery under the TCA); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-
60(3), (4), (5), (20), (25) (Supp. 2014) (detailing specific actions that a 
governmental entity is not liable for should a loss occur).  See also generally S.C. 
Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to -220 (Supp. 2014) (containing the entire TCA). 
15 

  
 
 
 
 
   
                                        
 
 
Trial testimony established that DSS cannot remove a child unless there is 
an unreasonable safety threat to the child, and that the standard practice is to keep 
children in the home when possible.  Moreover, in cases involving potential 
medical neglect, DSS caseworkers must consider medical evidence.  To that end, 
Parrish testified that in order to complete a medical neglect investigation, a 
caseworker must communicate with medical treatment providers, and that children 
cannot be removed from the home without fact-finding to substantiate the medical 
claim. 
Despite these prerequisites to removing a medically neglected child from the 
home, Parrish testified that she "did not look into the poisoning," but instead 
"wait[ed] for the lab results."5  Parrish acknowledged that she did not speak to a 
doctor about the children's illnesses or the lab results, yet she based the removal of 
the children solely on the possibility that the children had been poisoned by 
medication. 
Parrish stated that she did not consider her investigation "complete" because 
she never attempted to investigate the reasons for the potential poisoning by 
medication other than to wait for the lab results.  Similarly, because the case 
involved a potential poisoning, Parrish's supervisor testified that DSS should have 
done more to investigate the medication, such as contacting the pharmacy or 
Poison Control. 
Parrish testified further that she was unable to conduct a thorough 
investigation because she was unwell after a recent neck surgery, and was taking 
pain medication that affected her ability to perform her job functions.  Specifically, 
Parrish stated that at the time of the investigation, she was experiencing substantial 
physical pain and was barely able to complete simple tasks such as typing or even 
walking. Parrish testified that although she was supposed to be on light work duty 
at the DSS office, her supervisor threatened her job and forced her to do field work 
on Petitioners' case instead.6
5 There is some indication in the Record that the toxicology testing was 
inconclusive; however, the Record does not indicate what testing was performed. 
6 Parrish's supervisor disputed Parrish's claim of debilitating illness. 
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In an attempt to justify the removal, Parrish testified that when she and
another DSS employee inspected the Bass home on May 20, they found it to be in 
"disrepair."7  In addition, Parrish testified that Diane had recently been diagnosed 
with diabetes, and that she had confessed to Parrish that she sometimes 
experienced feelings of "sadness," "hopelessness," and was "often overwhelmed."8
Despite these purported grounds for removal, this information was not known to 
DSS when the agency removed the children for medical neglect. 
 Petitioners' expert, Michael Corey, is a social worker and consultant who has 
assisted states in implementing safety assessment models for investigation and 
treatment by child protective services.  He opined to a reasonable degree of 
certainty that DSS did not exercise slight care under these circumstances.  Corey 
testified that DSS has a duty to investigate allegations of abuse and neglect and the 
agency can do so negligently, gross negligently, or "competent[ly]."  Corey 
testified that Parrish's initial response at the hospital was "very good" and that she 
properly provided Diane and Otis with a brochure explaining their rights and held a 
family meeting; therefore, Corey found that Parrish exercised care in responding to 
the report and at the beginning of her investigation.  However, he opined that DSS 
should have only sought placement in a relative's home after determining that the 
children were not safe in their own home, and that DSS was grossly negligent in 
failing to conduct a proper investigation into the poisoning claims, and therefore 
was grossly negligent in removing the children from the home.   
Corey specifically pointed to the following evidence to support his opinion 
that DSS was grossly negligent: (1) Parrish, by her own testimony, was not capable 
of conducting the investigation due to her extreme pain and medication; (2) After 
Diane and Otis stated that they did not know what happened to their children 
except that they administered the medication, Parrish removed the children from
the home without an investigation into the medication; (3) Parrish did not 
interview or speak to any of the children's doctors, including Petitioners' family 
doctor; (4) Because DSS gave Diane and Otis a choice between removal to foster 
7 Conversely, DSS's expert testified that the condition of the home did not present 
an immediate threat of harm to the children.   
8 However, Parrish admitted that Diane's personal feelings were not grounds for 
removal.
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care or placement with family members and DSS did not consider whether the 
children would be safe in their own home, DSS coerced Diane and Otis into 
signing the safety plan; (5) Parrish did not inquire into the condition of Petitioners'
home before making a decision that the children should be removed; (6) DSS 
asked for a list of the children's medical providers for the first time on May 30; and 
(7) Parrish did not investigate Diane's medical condition before assuming that her 
condition harmed the children. 
In rebuttal, DSS called its former director, Jocelyn Goodwyn, as an expert in 
"certain aspects of [c]hild [p]rotective [s]ervices."  Like Corey, Goodwyn testified 
that DSS had acted appropriately in its initial response, and upon review of the file, 
testified that DSS properly gave Diane and Otis the DSS brochure and handbook 
explaining their rights under the law; held a family meeting; conducted an 
alternative site visit at Linda's home; entered a safety plan with Diane, Otis, and 
relative caregivers; held a staffing meeting within five days to consider the case; 
investigated Petitioners' home on May 20; and interviewed Diane, Otis, and family 
members.  Therefore, Goodwyn opined that there was no evidence that DSS acted 
in "bad faith." 
However, under cross-examination, Goodwyn admitted that DSS is required 
to conduct a thorough investigation before removing children from their parents, 
and DSS did not do so in this case. In addition, Goodwyn testified that there was 
no evidence that Diane and Otis harmed the children or that the children were in 
imminent risk of harm. In short, Goodwyn conceded that the removal should not 
have occurred "when it did." 
The remaining evidence at trial established that Diane and Otis loved their 
children and attended to all of their medical needs.  Moreover, Diane and Otis 
spent all of their free time with their children, and the children had never spent the 
night away from their parents prior to their removal by DSS.  Aside from being 
separated from the children, Petitioners presented evidence that Diane and Otis 
were injured by the implication that they would harm their children, even though 
they were regarded by family and others, including their family doctors, as 
excellent parents. Further, Alex and Hanna cried because they missed their parents 
during their removal, and Hanna no longer enjoyed a close relationship with Linda 
upon her return to her parents. A child psychologist opined that Hanna would 
require therapy to overcome emotional trauma and other resulting problems caused 
by the removal, although Hanna's autism contributed to this diagnosis.   
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DSS moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of Petitioners' case, and 
again at the conclusion of all of the evidence.  The trial judge denied both motions.  
At the conclusion of the evidence, Petitioners withdrew their defamation cause of 
action, and moved for a directed verdict regarding DSS's defenses of discretionary 
immunity and negligence of a third party.  The trial judge granted Petitioners'
motions for directed verdict as to those defenses.   
Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Petitioners, and awarded them $4 
million in damages.  DSS subsequently filed motions for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict (JNOV), for new trial absolute, and to reduce the verdict.  The trial 
court issued an order denying DSS's post-trial motions.  However, the trial court 
granted DSS's motion to reduce the verdict in accordance with the TCA's
limitations on damages.9  DSS filed a timely notice of appeal. 
The court of appeals reversed the jury's verdict.  See Bass, 403 S.C. at 184, 
742 S.E.2d at 667. First, the court of appeals found the trial court erred in refusing 
to grant DSS's motion for JNOV because there was no evidence in the record that 
DSS acted with gross negligence in conducting the investigation.  Id. at 190, 742 
S.E.2d at 670. The court of appeals found the twenty-four hour time constraint 
associated with the medium danger rating to be particularly instructive.  Id. at 192, 
742 S.E.2d at 671 (citing Spartanburg Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Little, 309 S.C. 
122, 125, 420 S.E.2d 499, 501 (1991)).  During this initial period, the court of 
appeals noted that (1) Parrish interviewed family members and learned the children 
became ill after Diane administered prescription medicine to the children; (2) 
Parrish obtained Diane's and Otis's consent to have the children's medical 
information released to DSS; and (3) Parrish procured the children's toxicology 
report, which was inconclusive. Id.  Thus, the court of appeals found that DSS's 
investigation into the possible poisoning, "[w]hile far from perfect," demonstrated 
the exercise of slight care.  Id. at 191, 742 S.C. at 671. 
In so holding, the court of appeals found Corey's opinion that DSS failed to 
exercise slight care insufficient to defeat DSS's motion for JNOV because the 
record was "devoid of any indication that Corey in any way took into account the 
expediency with which DSS must investigate claims of abuse and neglect."  Id. at 
9 See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-120 (Supp. 2014). 
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191–92, 742 S.E.2d at 671. Therefore, the court of appeals found "Corey failed to 
establish his opinion was based upon a proper statement of DSS's duty," and his 
opinion "could not, without more, defeat DSS's motion for JNOV."  Id. at 192, 742 
S.E.2d at 671 (citation omitted).   
Finally, in reversing the trial judge's refusal to grant JNOV as to the outrage 
claim, the court of appeals held that, because it determined DSS was not grossly 
negligent, Petitioners' outrage claim must fail.  More specifically, the court of 
appeals held that as a matter of law, DSS's conduct could not be reckless if the 
conduct was not found to be at least grossly negligent.  Id. at 193, 742 S.E.2d at 
672 (citations omitted).10
We granted Petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
ISSUES
I.	 Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that the trial court 
should have granted DSS's motion for JNOV? 
II.	 Whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the verdict as to 
the outrage claim? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In ruling on directed verdict or JNOV motions, the trial court is required to 
view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motions.  Sabb v. S.C. State Univ., 
350 S.C. 416, 427, 567 S.E.2d 231, 236 (2002) (citing Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of 
Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142 (1999)).  "[T]he trial 
judge is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight."  Curcio v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 355 S.C. 316, 320, 585 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2003).  Similarly, on 
appeal, "[t]he jury's verdict must be upheld unless no evidence reasonably supports 
10 The court of appeals found DSS's argument that the trial court erred in denying 
the JNOV motion because Diane and Otis voluntarily participated in the placement 
of the children unpreserved, and DSS did not appeal this finding.  Bass, 403 S.C. at 
192, 742 S.E.2d at 671 (citation omitted).   
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the jury's findings."  Id. at 320, 585 S.E.2d at 274 (citing Horry Cnty. v. Laychur, 
315 S.C. 364, 434 S.E.2d 259 (1993)).  Moreover, neither an appellate court nor 
the trial court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the 
testimony or the evidence.  Garrett v. Locke, 309 S.C. 94, 99, 419 S.E.2d 842, 845 
(Ct. App. 1992). 
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Gross Negligence
Petitioners ask this Court to reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
because under the applicable standard of review, the court of appeals was required 
to accept the jury verdict unless there was no evidence in the record that DSS acted
with gross negligence. DSS argues that because the evidence only yielded one 
reasonable inference—that DSS exercised slight care—the court of appeals' 
decision should be upheld.  
As an initial matter, we find as a matter of law that DSS did not act in a 
grossly negligent manner in the Emergency Protective Custody (EPC) removal of 
the poisoned children. EPC removal is typically associated with exigent 
circumstances and time constraints. Thus, this opinion should not be read to 
impose on DSS a duty to conduct the post-EPC investigation in a pre-EPC setting. 
However, because DSS's post-EPC investigation presented a jury question on the 
issue of gross negligence, we reverse the court of appeals.  
Under the TCA, a "governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from
. . . responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, 
control, confinement, or custody of any student, patient, prisoner, inmate, or client 
of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in 
a grossly negligent manner." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(25) (emphasis added). 
"Gross negligence is the intentional conscious failure to do something which 
it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought 
not to do." Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist. One, 341 S.C. 307, 310, 534 S.E.2d 
275, 277 (2000) (citing Clyburn v. Sumter Cnty. Dist. Seventeen, 317 S.C. 50, 451 
S.E.2d 885 (1994); Richardson v. Hambright, 296 S.C. 504, 374 S.E.2d 296 
(1988)). In other words, "[i]t is the failure to exercise slight care."  Id. at 310, 534 
S.E.2d at 277 (citation omitted).  "Gross negligence has also been defined as a 
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relative term, and means the absence of care that is necessary under the 
circumstances."  Id. (citing Hollins v. Richland Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 310 S.C. 486, 
427 S.E.2d 654 (1993)). Normally, the question of what activity constitutes gross 
negligence is a mixed question of law and fact.  Id.  However, "when the evidence 
supports but one reasonable inference, the question becomes a matter of law for the 
court." Id. (citation omitted). 
Expert Testimony 
Petitioners first argue that the court of appeals erred in holding that Corey's 
expert opinion lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.  We agree.
In finding Corey's opinion was not based on a proper statement of DSS's 
duty, the court of appeals relied on Harris Teeter, Inc. v. Moore & Van Allen, 
P.L.L.C., a professional malpractice case.  See 390 S.C. at 275, 701 S.E.2d at 742. 
There, the Court found that summary judgment was appropriate because the 
plaintiff's experts failed to define the correct legal standard of care or opine 
specifically how the defendants breached the standard of care.   Id. at 289, 701 
S.E.2d at 749. For example, when asked about the definition of standard of care 
upon which he relied to form his opinion, one of the experts responded, "It's my
standard." Id.  He further explained that his standard was that "of someone reading 
this at the end of the case," or "that of a businessman's lawyer."  Id.  Thus, the 
Court found that because the expert did not accurately portray the proper standard 
of care, his conclusory statement that the defendants breached the standard of care 
did not create a genuine issue of material fact.  Id.
Similarly, the plaintiff's second expert in Harris Teeter testified that the 
legal malpractice standard of care is a determination of what a "reasonably 
competent lawyer [would] do given the facts and situations they were handed."   
Id.  While the Court agreed that this "generic" statement was "true in the abstract," 
it found that the expert's testimony about how the defendants breached the standard 
of care was too general. Id. at 290–91, 701 S.E.2d at 749–50.  Thus, the Court 
found that this expert's testimony likewise did not create a genuine issue of 
material fact. Id. at 291, 701 S.E.2d at 750. 
Unlike the experts in Harris Teeter, in this case, Corey stated the proper 
standard of care and provided specific examples to support his opinion that DSS 
breached the standard of care.  Therefore, we find the court of appeals erred in 
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relying on Harris Teeter to discredit Corey's expert testimony and in finding that 
his testimony lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation.  Cf. Carter v. R.L. Jordan 
Oil Co., 294 S.C. 435, 441, 365 S.E.2d 324, 328 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating "[a]n 
expert is given wide latitude in determining the basis of his testimony"), rev'd on 
other grounds, 299 S.C. 439, 385 S.E.2d 820 (1989). 
Evidence of Gross Negligence 
Having determined that the court of appeals erred in discrediting Corey's 
testimony, we must next decide if there was any evidence in the record to support 
the jury's verdict.  See Curcio, 355 S.C. at 320, 585 S.E.2d at 274 (stating that in 
deciding a motion for JNOV, "the trial judge is concerned with the existence of 
evidence, not its weight"). Petitioners argue that Corey's testimony constituted 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury finding that DSS was grossly 
negligence. In addition, Petitioners argue that, notwithstanding Corey's testimony, 
there was ample evidence in the record to support the jury verdict.  We agree.
As an initial matter, we find the court of appeals misapprehended Parrish's
trial testimony in finding that Corey's testimony did not constitute evidence of 
gross negligence. Rather than testifying that she had twenty-four hours to conduct
the initial investigation, Parrish testified that she had twenty-four hours to respond
to the initial report. 
Therefore, Corey agreed with DSS that the agency exercised care in its 
initial response to the report, testifying that Parrish's response to the intake was 
"very good," in that Parrish arrived at the hospital within forty-five minutes, 
properly provided Petitioners with copies of required DSS brochures, conducted 
the required family meeting, and performed the required home study on Linda 
before placing the children with her.   Where Corey found fault with DSS's 
investigation was in DSS's failure to conduct a post-EPC investigation into the 
stated reason for the children's removal from the home—potential poisoning by 
prescription medication. For example, Corey noted that Parrish failed to interview 
the children's doctors, other medical staff at the hospital, or their family doctor who 
initially treated the children, and failed to investigate the medication after being 
told that the children fell ill shortly after Diane administered the Clonidine to them.  
Thus, we find that the court of appeals improperly found that Corey's testimony did 
not constitute evidence of DSS's gross negligence. 
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Moreover, because there was other evidence in the record that DSS was 
grossly negligent with respect to the post-EPC investigation, we find that the court 
of appeals placed undue weight on Corey's expert testimony.  See Berkeley Elec. 
Co-op, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 304 S.C. 15, 20, 402 S.E.2d 674, 677 
(1991) (stating "[w]here the expert's testimony is based upon facts sufficient to 
form the basis for an opinion, the trier of fact determines its probative value") 
(citation omitted)); see also Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 583, 328 S.E.2d 108, 
114 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating an appellate court cannot judge the credibility or 
weight that should be given expert testimony, as these considerations are for the 
jury) (citation omitted)).  In addition to Corey's testimony, DSS's employees 
testified that DSS failed to conduct any investigation into the medication during its 
post-EPC investigation, even though they claimed they based their decision to 
remove the children on the medicine.  Even DSS's own expert testified that the 
children's post-EPC removal from the home was unlawful.  Thus, there was 
additional, independent evidence that DSS acted in a grossly negligent fashion 
with respect to this investigation. 
In sum, we agree with Petitioners that the court of appeals applied the wrong 
analysis, and in doing so, acted outside its limited scope of review.  Rather than 
examining the record to discern whether there was any evidence put forward at 
trial to support the jury verdict, the court of appeals seems to have searched the 
record for evidence to corroborate DSS's theory of the case—that it acted with 
slight care. However, even though DSS presented some evidence that it acted with 
slight care regarding certain aspects of its investigation, especially in the pre-EPC 
removal setting, there was likewise ample evidence in the record that DSS acted 
with gross negligence with respect to the post-EPC investigation—or lack thereof.  
Accordingly, we cannot say that the record was devoid of evidence to support the 
jury's verdict, and we reverse the court of appeals.   
II. Outrage
Next, Petitioners contend the court of appeals' misapprehended the scope of 
their outrage claim because that claim was not limited to the initial improper 
removal of the children, but involved Petitioners' averments that they were 
subjected to reckless, cruel, inhumane, and unwarranted family disruption over a 
period of eight months following the return of the children to the home.  We 
disagree with Petitioners that the evidence supported a verdict in their favor for the 
outrage claim.
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To recover for outrage—otherwise known as intentional infliction of 
emotional distress—a plaintiff must establish the following: 
 
(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional 
distress, or was certain, or substantially certain, that such distress 
would result from his conduct; 
 
(2) the conduct was so "extreme and outrageous" so as to exceed "all 
possible bounds of decency" and must be regarded as "atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community;" 
 
(3) the actions of the defendant caused plaintiff's emotional distress; 
and 
 
(4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was "severe" such 
that "no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." 
 
Argoe v. Three Rivers Behavioral Health, L.L.C., 392 S.C. 462, 475, 710 S.E.2d 
67, 74 (2011) (quoting Hansson v. Scalise Builders of S.C., 374 S.C. 352, 356, 650 
S.E.2d 68, 70 (2007)). In Hansson, this Court stated: 
 
Under the heightened standard of proof for emotional distress claims 
emphasized in Ford, a party cannot establish a prima facie claim for 
damages resulting from a defendant's tortious conduct with mere bald 
assertions. To permit a plaintiff to legitimately state a cause of action 
by simply alleging, "I suffered emotional distress" would be 
irreconcilable with this Court's development of the law in this area. In 
the words of Justice Littlejohn, the court must look for something 
"more"—in the form of third party witness testimony and other 
corroborating evidence—in order to make a prima facie showing of 
"severe" emotional distress. 
 
374 S.C. at 358–59, 650 S.E.2d at 72 (citing Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 
S.E.2d 776 (1981)). 
 
 There is no evidence in the Record that DSS's conduct was so "extreme and 
outrageous" that it exceeded "all possible bounds of decency" and must be 
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regarded as "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."  Id.; see, 
e.g., Gattison v. S.C. State Coll., 318 S.C. 148, 157, 456 S.E.2d 414, 419 (Ct. App. 
1995) (stating "these facts do not rise to the level required for outrage in South 
Carolina" because the plaintiff "has shown no hostile or abusive encounters, or 
coercive or oppressive conduct," even though the facts demonstrated 
"unprofessional, inappropriate behavior").  Thus, even considering the eight-month 
time period during which DSS continued to have contact with the Bass family, the 
evidence does not support the verdict as to the outrage cause of action.    
However, because the jury was provided with (and neither party objected to) 
a general verdict form and because we have upheld the gross negligence finding, 
we reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the verdict.  See, e.g., Anderson v. 
West, 270 S.C. 184, 241 S.E.2d 551 (1978) (where a case is submitted to the jury 
on two or more issues and a general verdict is returned, the verdict will be upheld 
if the verdict is supported by at least one issue); see also Harold Tyner Dev. 
Builders, Inc. v. Firstmark Dev. Corp., 311 S.C. 447, 429 S.E.2d 819 (Ct. App. 
1993) (same); Dwyer v. Tom Jenkins Realty, 289 S.C. 118, 120, 344 S.E.2d 886, 
888 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Where a decision is based on two grounds, either of which, 
independent of the other, is sufficient to support it, it will not be reversed on appeal 
because one of those grounds is erroneous" (quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error
§ 727 (1962)); id. ("[E]rroneous findings by the trial court . . . are [not] reversible 
error where the inclusion of such findings . . . would not change the judgment . . ." 
(quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error § 819 (1962)).11
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is 
REVERSED. 
PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.
11 We reinstate the verdict subject to the trial court's reduction of the award in 
accordance with the TCA's limitations on damages. 
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Christian Stegmaier and Amy L. Neuschafer, both of 
Collins and Lacy, PC, of Columbia, for Respondents/ 
Petitioners. 
CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: In this products liability action, Trinity 
Manufacturing, Inc. (Trinity), and Matrix Outsourcing, LLC (Matrix), argue that 
the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's decision to grant summary 
judgment to them on a strict liability cause of action.  See Lawing v. Trinity Mfg., 
Inc., 406 S.C. 13, 749 S.E.2d 126 (2013).  In their cross-appeal, Scott and Tammy 
Lawing ask this Court to reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the trial 
court's decision to charge the jury on the sophisticated user defense.  We affirm in 
part and reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case revolves around the packaging and labeling of sodium bromate, a 
chemical which contributed to a fire that occurred in a plant owned by Engelhard 
Corporation (Engelhard) in Seneca, South Carolina, in June 2004.  At the time of 
the fire, Scott Lawing worked at Engelhard's Seneca plant as a maintenance 
mechanic.1  Engelhard produced a precious metal catalyst used in the automobile 
industry, and refined metals from recycled materials.   
To complete its refining process, Engelhard used approximately 120 metric 
tons per annum of sodium bromate, which is classified as an oxidizer.  An oxidizer 
is a chemical that initiates or promotes combustion in other materials, thereby 
causing fire either by itself or through the release of oxygen or other gases.  In 
other words, when an oxidizer such as sodium bromate is heated to a certain 
temperature, it releases oxygen and contributes to the combustion of other 
materials.   
1 Engelhard was later purchased by BASF Corporation, which now operates the 
facility. 
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Engelhard purchased the sodium bromate from Univar USA, Inc. (Univar).  
Univar sourced the sodium bromate through Trinity, who in turn, utilized its 
subsidiary, Matrix, to obtain the sodium bromate from a Chinese manufacturer.  
The Chinese manufacturer shipped the sodium bromate to the Port of Charleston, 
and from there, a common freight carrier delivered the sodium bromate directly to 
Engelhard. Therefore, neither Univar, Trinity, nor Matrix ever inspected or 
handled the sodium bromate.    
The shipment of sodium bromate involved in the fire was delivered to 
Engelhard on February 16, 2004, whereupon Engelhard inspected and accepted the 
shipment.  The sodium bromate arrived packaged in woven plastic bags, each 
weighing twenty-five kilograms.2  A warning label on one side of each bag 
displayed the universally recognized yellow oxidizer symbol.3  The reverse side of 
each bag contained black text, including the words "sodium bromate," and other 
information regarding the material safety data sheet (MSDS)4 for sodium bromate.   
The bags of sodium bromate arrived at Engelhard stacked upon each other 
on wooden pallets, with thirty-six bags per pallet.  The pallets were stacked two 
pallets high. Each of the pallets was "shrink-wrapped" so that the bags would 
remain on the pallet.    
Paul Bailey, an Engelhard employee who was responsible for receiving 
shipments when the fire occurred, testified that none of the pallets in the February 
2 Specifically, the bags were made of polypropylene and polyethylene—both 
combustible materials.   
3 The oxidizer symbol is a yellow diamond with black borders.  Inside the diamond 
is a drawing of a flame, and underneath, the words "OXIDIZER" or "OXIDIZING 
AGENT" appear in black ink.  The United States Department of Transportation 
requires this symbol be used in the labeling of oxidizers such as sodium bromate.  
See 49 C.F.R. § 172.426 (2003). 
4 Along with the delivery of the chemical, Engelhard was provided the MSDS for 
sodium bromate.  The MSDS warned that if sodium bromate made contact with 
other materials, it could cause a fire, and that sodium bromate "[m]ay accelerate 
burning if involved in a fire."  Engelhard maintained MSDSs in offices throughout 
its plant for the various chemicals used in its production.  
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2004 shipment contained warnings identifying the contents of the pallets as an 
oxidizer, and there were no warnings on the sides of the bags themselves that could 
be seen through the shrink-wrap.  Within each shrink-wrapped pallet, some bags of 
the sodium bromate were stacked so that the black text on the bags appeared face-
up, while other bags were positioned such that the yellow oxidizer symbol 
appeared face-up.   
At trial, Dr. Jerry Purswell, who testified as an expert in the field of 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulations, opined that 
the labeling on the bags of sodium bromate did not satisfy the OSHA HazCom 
requirements5 for an appropriate warning label because the oxidizer symbol was 
not prominently displayed on the bags.  Dr. Purswell testified that in his opinion, 
the written material on the bags did, however, satisfy the relevant Department of 
Transportation (DOT) requirements.6
Upon receipt of a shipment of sodium bromate, Engelhard employees 
typically moved the double-stacked pallets of sodium bromate—still shrink­
wrapped—directly to the warehouse for storage, where Engelhard stored the 
chemical until it was needed for production.   
On May 20, 2004—the week before Engelhard's annual "shutdown week"— 
Engelhard employees moved four pallets of sodium bromate from the warehouse to 
the refinery hallway to be used in production.  During the shutdown week, 
Engelhard stopped regular production in order to perform routine maintenance.  
However, Engelhard policies provided that production materials were not to be left 
in the refinery during shutdown week. 
On June 1, 2004, Lawing, along with Keith Black and Curtis Martin, were 
assigned to work under Steve Knox during the shutdown week as part of a 
5 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(f) (2003). Essentially, the regulation requires labels on 
the containers of hazardous chemicals; states that the labels must provide the 
identity of the hazardous chemicals and appropriate hazard warnings; and 
describes other requirements for the labels, i.e., that the warnings must be 
"prominently displayed on the container."  See id.
6 49 C.F.R. § 172.406 (2003) (describing the proper placement of labels on 
packages containing hazardous materials); 49 C.F.R. § 172.407 (2003) (setting 
forth requisite label specifications, such as durability, design, size, and color).
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maintenance crew tasked with using an oxyacetylene cutting torch to cut out and 
replace condensate pipe in the refinery hall—not far from where the four pallets of 
sodium bromate had recently been moved.   
Pursuant to Engelhard's policies, use of the oxyacetylene torch required the 
issuance of a hazardous work permit prior to the commencement of the project.   
Engelhard policies provided that before the permit could be issued, "a thorough 
inspection of the immediate work area and all areas adjacent for the presence of 
combustible and/or flammable materials" must take place and that "[a]ll such 
materials will be removed to a safe location for the duration of the Hotwork [sic]."  
Therefore, to obtain a hazardous work permit for the project, Knox toured the work 
area prior to the start of the maintenance work.  Knox testified that he noticed the 
pallets of sodium bromate within the work area, and walked close enough to the 
pallets to ensure that there was no oxidizer symbol on them.  Although Knox did 
not see the oxidizer symbol, he noticed black text on the sides of the bags.  Knox 
did not know what sodium bromate was, but admitted that if he had seen an 
oxidizer symbol on the pallets, he would have ensured that employees moved the 
pallets from the work area before the maintenance began.7
Martin and Lawing each testified that they noticed the bags of sodium
bromate in the work area on the day of the fire, but saw no label indicating that 
they should move the bags.  Lawing testified that when he saw the bags, he 
looked for a "label or something that told me I needed to move it" and when he did 
not see one, he "thought they were fine." Lawing stated that if he had seen an 
oxidizer symbol, he would have moved the pallets.  Lawing testified that at the 
time, he thought the bags contained baking soda.   
The maintenance crew used the oxyacetylene torch to cut the pipe, which
was suspended approximately fifteen to twenty feet above the floor.  After about 
two hours of work, a piece of hot slag fell and landed on or near one of the pallets 
of sodium bromate.  There was a "flash" on the pallet, which erupted into a ball of 
fire that engulfed Lawing, Martin, and Black.  According to Knox, the eruption of 
fire "sounded like a jet taking off." 
7 Prior to the project, each of the maintenance workers received hazard 
communication training which taught them to recognize warning symbols— 
including the oxidizer symbol—on packages of chemicals as well as the 
importance of such labels.  
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Each of the men suffered severe burns and serious injuries which totally 
disabled them and rendered them in need of substantial medical care for the rest of 
their lives. Lawing testified that he suffered second and third degree burns on 
forty-two percent of his body, and that his lungs and eyes were also burned.  
The Lawings—as well as Black and Martin (collectively, the plaintiffs)8
commenced lawsuits against Univar, Trinity, and Matrix (collectively, the 
defendants), each alleging causes of action for strict liability, negligence, and 
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.9  The Lawings also asserted a 
breach of express warranty cause of action against Univar.  Further, Tammy 
Lawing contended that she suffered loss of consortium as a result of her husband's 
injuries. 
Prior to trial, the defendants made a number of dispositive motions, 
including motions for summary judgment on the Lawings' claims. In particular, 
the defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment on the Lawings' strict 
liability cause of action. The trial court addressed these motions and other matters 
during a two-day pre-trial hearing. The trial court granted the defendants' motion 
for summary judgment on the strict liability claim, ruling that Lawing was not a 
"user" of sodium bromate as required by section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina 
Code. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-73-10 (2005) (requiring a plaintiff to be a "user" or 
"consumer" of a product to recover under a strict liability theory).
The trial court consolidated the plaintiffs' cases and bifurcated the trial into a 
liability phase and a damages phase.  Five causes of action were submitted to the 
jury. Three were against all of the defendants:  negligence as to packaging, 
8 Of the three plaintiffs whose cases were consolidated for trial, the Lawings are 
the only plaintiffs involved in this appeal. 
9 Each plaintiff sought and received workers' compensation benefits as a result of 
the fire. Accordingly, the Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive 
remedy against Engelhard.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-540 (2015) (providing that 
the rights and remedies granted to an employee under the Workers' Compensation 
Act "shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal 
representative, parents, dependents or next of kin as against his employer, at 
common law or otherwise, on account of such injury loss of service or death"). 
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negligence as to warning labels,10 and breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability.  Two causes of action were against Univar only:  breach of 
express warranty as to packaging and breach of express warranty as to warning 
labels. 
Although the trial court had denied the defendants' motion for a directed 
verdict as to the sophisticated user defense at the conclusion of all of the evidence, 
the court charged the defense to the jury.  As to the negligence cause of action, the 
trial court charged the jury, in pertinent part: 
Federal regulations impose a duty on suppliers to warn of possible 
dangers arising from the use of their product.  This requirement comes 
from the [OSHA] regulation[] 1910.1200(f), which says that the 
chemical manufacturer, importer, or distributor shall ensure that each 
container of hazardous chemicals leaving the workplace is labeled, 
tagged or marked with the following: [i]dentity of the hazardous 
chemicals; appropriate hazard warnings; and the name and address of 
the chemical manufacturer, importer, or other responsible party. The 
federal regulations are in evidence.  The court has ruled that the 
circumstantial evidence in the case proves that the bags were labeled. 
The plaintiff alleged that the labels were not clearly visible or 
prominently displayed, not that there was not a label on the bags.   
The trial court then explained that South Carolina common law requires a supplier 
of a dangerous product to provide a warning to the user, consumer, or purchaser.  
The trial court stated: 
A supplier may provide the information needed for the safe use of the 
product to a third person, but this may not relieve the supplier of 
responsibility in all cases. Where the supplier provides the 
information to a third person, and not directly to the user, consumer, 
or purchaser, the supplier must give all the information needed for the 
product's safe use and must use a method of giving that information 
that reasonably ensures that it will reach the user, consumer, and 
10 With regard to the claims involving the warning labels—or lack thereof—on the 
sodium bromate, the plaintiffs proceeded under the theory that the suppliers should 
be held liable because the requisite warning labels were not prominently displayed 
or clearly visible. 
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purchaser. The supplier must inform the third person of the dangerous 
character of the product or of the precautions which must be used in 
using the product to make it safe.  The supplier has a duty to be 
reasonably sure that the information or warning about the product will 
reach those the supplier should expect to use the product.  To 
determine whether the supplier should reasonably expect the method 
used to reach the user, consumer, or purchaser, you should consider 
the magnitude of the danger, the purpose for which the product is 
made, and the practical means of disclosing the information. If the 
supplier should reasonably foresee that the warnings given to third 
parties, will not be adequately passed on to the probable users, 
consumers, or purchasers of the product and that the dangers will not 
be obvious to the users, consumers, or purchasers, the supplier's duty 
to warn may extend to those persons endangered or affected by the 
foreseeable use of the product. A sophisticated user defense could be 
appropriate under the circumstances. I will charge you on the 
sophisticated user defense later. 
After explaining the elements of negligence, the trial court charged the 
sophisticated user defense: 
 The [defendants] have also pled the sophisticated user defense. 
Now, ladies and gentlemen, under the South Carolina law, a 
distributor or supplier has no duty to warn of potential risks or dangers 
inherent in a product if the product is distributed to what we call a 
learned intermediary or distributed to a sophisticated user who might 
be in a position to understand and assess the risks involved, and to 
inform the ultimate user of the risks, and to, therefore, warn the 
ultimate user of any alleged inherent dangers involved in the product. 
Simply stated, the sophisticated user defense is permitted in cases 
involving an employer who was aware of the inherent dangers of a 
product which the employer purchased for use in his business and can 
be reasonably relied upon to warn ultimate users of the product. Such 
an employer has a duty to warn his employees of the danger of the 
product. 
You may consider a number of factors in determining whether 
the sophisticated user [defense] applies. Those factors include: The 
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dangerous condition of the product; the purpose for which the product 
is used; the form of any warnings given; the reliability of the third 
party as a conduit of necessary information about the product; the 
magnitude of the risk involved and the burdens imposed on the 
supplier by requiring that it directly warn all users. 
If you find that the sophisticated user defense applies in this 
case, then you must find that the defendants owed no duty to warn; 
therefore, you must find in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs'
negligence claim. 
The jury found for the Lawings on only one cause of action:  breach of 
express warranty as to warning labels against Univar. The jury returned defense 
verdicts on the Lawings' other causes of action.  Thereby, Trinity and Matrix were 
absolved of liability.11
A consolidated appeal to the court of appeals followed.  However, during the 
pendency of the appeal, Univar settled with all of the plaintiffs.  Only the Lawings'
appeal of the grant of summary judgment on their strict liability claim and their 
appeal of the jury verdict in favor of Trinity and Matrix proceeded to disposition at 
the court of appeals. 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to charge the 
sophisticated user defense on the negligence and breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability claims.  Lawing, 406 S.C. at 33, 749 S.E.2d at 136.  In addition, 
the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision to grant Trinity and Matrix's
summary judgment motion on the strict liability claim, finding that the trial court 
too narrowly interpreted the term "user" under section 15-73-10, and holding that 
Lawing was indeed a "user" of sodium bromate for purposes of the statute.  Id. at 
37, 749 S.E.2d at 138.  Therefore, the court of appeals remanded the matter for a 
new trial on the Lawings' strict liability claim.  Id. at 37, 749 S.E.2d at 139. 
The Lawings, as well as Trinity and Matrix, filed petitions for writs of 
certiorari, asking this Court to review the court of appeals' decision.  This Court 
granted both petitions for writs of certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion 
pursuant to Rule 242, SCACR. 
11 Black and Martin settled with Trinity and Matrix before trial.   
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 ISSUES PRESENTED
 
I. 	 Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Lawing was 
a "user" of the sodium bromate for purposes of section 15-73­
10, and thus reversing the trial court's decision to grant Trinity 
and Matrix summary judgment on the Lawings' strict liability 
cause of action? 
II. 	 Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's 
decision to charge the jury on the sophisticated user defense? 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. 	 Strict Liability Cause of Action 
 Trinity and Matrix argue that the court of appeals erred in holding that 
Lawing was a "user" of the sodium bromate, and therefore, the court of appeals 
erred in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the strict liability 
claim, which was based on the trial court's finding that Lawing was not considered 
a "user" under section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina Code.  Moreover, Trinity 
and Matrix argue that the court of appeals set forth a far too expansive definition of 
"user" for purposes of a strict liability analysis under South Carolina law.   
a. Standard of Review 
 When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court 
applies the same standard as that used by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), 
SCRCP. Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 122, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011).  
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Turner, 392 S.C. at 766, 708 
S.E.2d at 769. 
 "Determining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and 
this Court reviews questions of law de novo."  Perry v. Bullock, 409 S.C. 137, 140, 
761 S.E.2d 251, 252–53 (2014) (citation omitted). 
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b. Section 15-73-10 
Section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina Code provides that "[o]ne who sells 
any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer . . . is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 15-73-10 (2005) (emphasis added).12  This 
section imposes strict liability upon the manufacturer and seller of a product for an 
injury to any "user or consumer" if the product reaches the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.  Id.; Fleming v. 
Borden, Inc., 316 S.C. 452, 457, 450 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1994).
Section 15-73-10 does not define "user."  Instead, the General Assembly 
expressly adopted the comments to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 
(Second)—which discuss the meaning of "user"—as the expression of legislative 
intent for that section. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-73-30 (2005) ("Comments to 
[section] 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second, are incorporated herein by 
reference as the legislative intent of this chapter.").   
 Comment l to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second), titled 
"User or consumer," provides in pertinent part: 
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, it is not necessary 
that the ultimate user or consumer have acquired the product directly 
from the seller, although the rule applies equally if he does so. He 
may have acquired it through one or more intermediate dealers. It is 
not even necessary that the consumer have purchased the product at 
all. He may be a member of the family of the final purchaser, or his 
employee, or a guest at his table, or a mere donee from the purchaser. 
The liability stated is one in tort, and does not require any contractual 
relation, or privity of contract, between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
· · · 
12 "This provision, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1974, codified, 
nearly verbatim, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A."  In re Breast Implant 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 331 S.C. 540, 545, 503 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1998). 
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“User” includes those who are passively enjoying the benefit of the 
product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles or airplanes, as 
well as those who are utilizing it for the purpose of doing work 
upon it, as in the case of an employee of the ultimate buyer who is 
making repairs upon the automobile which he has purchased. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. l (1965) (emphasis added). 
 Comment o, however, explains that in comment l, the American Law 
Institute (ALI) did not intend to express either approval or disapproval of 
expanding section 402A to allow recovery to those other than users or consumers.  
Comment o provides, in pertinent part:
Thus far the courts, in applying the rule stated in this Section, have 
not gone beyond allowing recovery to users and consumers, as those 
terms are defined in Comment l. Casual bystanders, and others who 
may come in contact with the product, as in the case of employees of 
the retailer, or a passer-by injured by an exploding bottle, or a 
pedestrian hit by an automobile, have been denied recovery.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. o (emphasis added). 
We have not yet applied the comments to section 402A to determine 
whether a plaintiff should be considered a "user" under section 15-73-10.  In fact, 
there has been only one occasion on which we have addressed the interpretation of 
the term "user" under section 15-73-10 for purposes of a strict liability claim. See 
Bray v. Marathon Corp., 356 S.C. 111, 116, 588 S.E.2d 93, 95 (2003).   
In Bray, we found that an employee who suffered an emotional injury after 
watching a coworker being crushed by a trash compactor was a "user" of the trash 
compactor for purposes of section 15-73-10 because she was operating the controls 
of the defective trash compactor at the time of the accident.  356 S.C. at 116, 588 
S.E.2d at 95. Further, in line with comment o, we provided that a bystander 
analysis does not apply to a strict liability cause of action, stating that a "user of a 
defective product is not a mere bystander but a primary and direct victim of the 
product defect." Id. at 117, 588 S.E.2d at 95. 
The Lawings argue that Lawing was precisely the type of user for whom any 
warnings on the sodium bromate should have been intended, and therefore, the 
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comments to section 402A support reversal of the trial court's decision on this 
issue. We agree.
 As an expert at trial testified, a product's labeling is considered part of the 
product's package.  See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. h ("No 
reason is apparent for distinguishing between the product itself and the container in 
which it is supplied; and the two are purchased by the user or consumer as an 
integrated whole."). The very purpose of warnings issued through labels on 
products is "to provide information to people about hazards and safety information 
they do not know about so they may avoid the product altogether or avoid the 
danger by careful use." David G. Owen, Products Liability Law 621 (2d ed. 2008). 
Indeed, labels and other aspects of packaging are typically a user's first line of 
defense in assessing a product's danger, and oftentimes, the only indication that a 
product is a highly flammable or otherwise dangerous product.  
The fact that Lawing noticed the pallets of sodium bromate within the work 
area on the day of the fire—but failed to request their removal because he did not 
see a label indicating their dangerous nature—is crucial for purposes of 
determining whether he should be considered a "user" of the sodium bromate.  
According to Lawing's testimony, he used the sodium bromate's labeling—or the 
lack thereof—to evaluate the safety of the product the day of the fire.  Therefore, 
we find that Lawing's actions fall under comment l because Lawing used the 
information on the sodium bromate's packaging to complete work in close 
proximity to the pallets of sodium bromate, and to assess the need to avoid or 
move the nearby sodium bromate, regardless of the fact that he did not actually 
handle the sodium bromate.    
Similar to the court of appeals, we find that Lawing was not a "casual 
bystander" with regard to the sodium bromate.  See Lawing, 406 S.C. at 34, 749 
S.E.2d at 137. On the day of the fire, there was the potential for Lawing to interact 
with the sodium bromate while completing his work in the refinery hall, especially 
after Engelhard employees failed to move the sodium bromate from the work area 
before the maintenance began.  As the court of appeals stated, the examples set out 
in comment o "illustrate that the [ALI] intended that the people to be excluded 
from the definition of 'user' and 'consumer' are much farther removed from the 
product than Lawing and his co-workers were from the sodium bromate."  Id. 
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c. Court of Appeals' Definition of "User" 
Although the court of appeals properly found that Lawing should be 
considered a "user" under section 15-73-10, we agree with Trinity and Matrix's
contention that the court of appeals set forth far too broad a definition of "user" for 
purposes of a strict liability analysis in South Carolina. 
After citing the comments to section 402A discussing the definition of 
"user," the court of appeals stated: 
Considering the comments together, we believe the legislature 
intended that the term “user” include persons who could 
foreseeably come into contact with the dangerous nature of a 
product.  Thus, a person who examines a product for warnings and 
other safety information is one whom the seller intends will use that 
information to avoid the dangers associated with the product, and thus 
is a person who foreseeably could come into contact with its 
dangerous nature. 
Lawing, 406 S.C at 34–35, 749 S.E.2d at 137 (emphasis added). 
As evident from our application to Lawing in this case, we would not restrict 
the term "user" to plaintiffs who are injured while handling or operating the 
dangerous product. However, the court of appeals' expansive definition including 
as a "user" all "persons who could foreseeably come into contact with the 
dangerous nature of a product" could be interpreted as to allow a bystander 
employee to recover under section 15-73-10.  As discussed, supra, Bray clearly 
prohibits bystander recovery for purposes of strict liability.  See Bray, 356 S.C. at 
117, 588 S.E.2d at 95. Furthermore, including a foreseeability analysis in a 
determination of whether a plaintiff constitutes a "user" under section 15-73-10 is 
improper.  See Bray, 356 S.C. at 117, 588 S.E.2d at 96 ("Because [section] 15-73­
10 limits liability to the user or consumer, there is no need for a limitation on 
foreseeable victims to avoid disproportionate liability as was found necessary in 
the bystander setting."). 
A case-by-case analysis is more appropriate for courts' determination of who 
constitutes a "user" under section 15-73-10. Therefore, we hold that the court of 
appeals erred in setting forth its broad definition of "user," and affirm as modified 
the court of appeals' decision on this issue. 
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II. Sophisticated User Jury Instruction 
The Lawings argue that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial 
court's decision to charge the sophisticated user defense to the jury.  We agree.
An appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision regarding jury 
instructions unless the trial court committed an abuse of discretion.  Cole v. Raut, 
378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008) (citing Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 
369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000)).  An abuse of discretion occurs when the 
trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence. 
Id.
Suppliers and manufacturers of dangerous products are generally under a 
duty to warn the ultimate user of the dangers associated with the use of the 
product. See Livingston v. Noland Corp., 293 S.C. 521, 525, 362 S.E.2d 16, 18 
(1987) (citing Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding 
that the duty to warn arises when the user may not realize the potential danger of a 
product)). However, the sophisticated user doctrine, which arose from comment n 
to section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,13 recognizes that a supplier 
may rely on an intermediary to provide warnings to the ultimate user if the reliance 
is reasonable under the circumstances.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 
cmt. n.  The sophisticated user doctrine is typically applied as a defense to relieve 
the supplier of liability for failure to warn where it is difficult or even impossible 
for the supplier to meet its duty to warn the end user of the dangers associated with 
the use of a product, and the supplier therefore relies on the intermediary or 
employer to warn the end user.  See id.
13 Section 388 provides that one who supplies a chattel directly or through a third 
person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability for physical harm caused 
by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it 
is supplied, if the supplier:  (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is 
likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied; (b) has no reason to 
believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous 
condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous 
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 388 (1965).
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In arguing that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's 
decision to charge the jury on the sophisticated user defense, the Lawings contend 
that the sophisticated user defense is not the law of South Carolina.  We agree that 
prior to the court of appeals' opinion in this case, neither this Court, nor the court 
of appeals, had explicitly adopted the defense.14  However, we need not formally 
adopt the doctrine at this time because as discussed, infra, the facts of this case do 
not implicate the sophisticated user defense.15
When instructing the jury, the trial court is required to charge only principles 
of law that apply to the issues raised in the pleadings and developed by the 
evidence in support of those issues.  Clark, 339 S.C. at 390, 529 S.E.2d at 539 
(citing Tucker v. Reynolds, 268 S.C. 330, 335, 233 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1977)). 
14 The court of appeals stated in its opinion that when it affirmed a trial court's 
decision to charge the jury on the sophisticated user defense in Bragg v. Hi-
Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 462 S.E.2d 321 (1995), the court "recognized that the 
sophisticated user doctrine is part of the products liability law of South Carolina."  
Lawing, 406 S.C. at 23, 749 S.E.2d at 131.  In affirming the jury charge in Bragg, 
however, the court of appeals referenced section 388 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts—upon which the sophisticated user doctrine is based—but did not state 
whether South Carolina courts had adopted that section.  Bragg, 319 S.C. at 550, 
462 S.E.2d at 332 ("The sophisticated user defense outlined in section 388 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts has been adopted by numerous jurisdictions.").  We 
note that the only mention of section 388 from this Court—albeit not in the context 
of whether the sophisticated user defense is a viable one—was in a dissent in 
Claytor v. General Motors Corporation, 277 S.C. 259, 267, 286 S.E.2d 129, 133 
(1982) (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).  Further, although the court in Bragg found that 
the jury's charge was an "accurate recitation" of the sophisticated user doctrine as 
"adopted by a majority of jurisdictions," it did not provide that the sophisticated 
user defense was in fact the law of South Carolina. See Bragg, 319 S.C. at 550–51,
462 S.E.2d at 332. 
15 Likewise, to the extent that the Lawings contest the correctness of the trial 
court's sophisticated user defense jury charge—which took a common law 
approach to the doctrine, as opposed to the Restatement approach—we do not 
address that issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding that the Court need not address 
remaining issues when resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 
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Accordingly, the threshold question in determining whether the trial judge erred in 
charging the sophisticated user defense to the jury is whether the law was 
implicated by the evidence in this case.  We find that it was not, and therefore hold 
that the trial court erred in charging the sophisticated user defense. 
Trinity and Matrix—similar to the court of appeals—center their argument 
around Engelhard's knowledge of the nature and use of sodium bromate, an 
unsurprising approach given that the sophisticated user defense revolves around an 
intermediary's knowledge and awareness of the danger associated with the use of a 
particular product. See Lawing, 406 S.C. at 30–32, 749 S.E.2d at 135–36. Indeed, 
based on the testimony in this case, there is no doubt that Engelhard was very 
familiar with sodium bromate and understood its dangerous nature.   
However, a sophisticated user has a responsibility separate and apart from 
the responsibility to adequately label a dangerous product.  Under the specific 
factual circumstances in this case, the proper focus is the labeling on the sodium
bromate shipped to Engelhard, not the use of sodium bromate in Engelhard's plant.  
Engelhard's knowledge of the dangers of sodium bromate does not affect the  
suppliers' duty to properly label sodium bromate as a hazardous and flammable 
product, because the knowledge of sodium bromate's inherent qualities are useless 
to a person who comes into contact with the chemical but cannot identify it.16
In other words, there is a critical distinction between an intermediary's
knowledge of the dangerous qualities and nature of a product, and the ability of the 
third party user to identify and recognize that product on its face.  When 
considering only Engelhard's use of sodium bromate in its manufacturing process, 
it follows that Engelhard is a "sophisticated user."  However, when, as here, 
labeling is the underlying issue, the adequacy of the labeling on the sodium
bromate does not require a sophisticated user analysis.  If we conflate the two 
analyses—as the dissent would have us do—we would absolutely absolve 
suppliers of their responsibility to label dangerous products during shipment and 
upon delivery. The fact that a sophisticated user of a particular product ultimately 
receives the product does not permit the supplier to decide whether or not to 
adequately label the dangerous product as such. 
16 The trial court apparently had a similar concern while hearing pre-trial motions, 
as it asked counsel, "How is a sophisticated user like Engelhard and their 
employees going to know the stuff is what it is unless it is properly labeled?" 
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Black testified that employees like himself utilized labeling on products as 
their "first line of defense" within the plant.  Because maintenance workers, 
including Lawing, received training to familiarize themselves with hazard labels, 
i.e., the oxidizer symbol, with no visible hazard label, these employees who 
encountered the shrink-wrapped pallets of sodium bromate were unable to identify 
it as a dangerous product. Under these facts, Engelhard's knowledge regarding the 
properties of sodium bromate and its transfer of that information to its employees
is insignificant. 
Therefore, we find that the evidence does not support a jury charge on the 
sophisticated user defense because the evidence in this case that does support that 
charge—i.e., Engelhard's experience with sodium bromate, the fact that it 
employed chemical engineers, and the MSDSs which were available—is merely a 
distraction from the real issue: the visibility of the labels indicating danger on the 
pallets of sodium bromate.  Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in 
charging the sophisticated user defense to the jury, and we reverse the court of 
appeals' decision on this issue. 
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the court of appeals' decision reversing 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Trinity and Matrix on the Lawings'
strict liability claim, but in doing so, modify the definition of "user" set forth by the 
court of appeals for purposes of section 15-73-10. 
Further, because the evidence in this case does not support the sophisticated 
user defense, we find that trial court erred in charging the defense to the jury.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the jury charge, 
and remand the Lawings' negligence and implied warranty of merchantability 
claims for a new trial.
BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur. KITTREDGE, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part in a separate opinion.  PLEICONES, J., dissenting in a 
separate opinion.
44 

  
 
 
  
                                        
  
 
JUSTICE KITTREDGE: I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part. I join 
the majority in its construction of the term "user" for purposes of section 15-73-10 
of the South Carolina Code (2005). I dissent with respect to the "sophisticated 
user" doctrine and would adopt what I believe to be the excellent analysis of the 
court of appeals concerning the doctrine and its application to this case. 
I offer two additional comments. First, I do not agree with the majority "that prior 
to the court of appeals' opinion in this case, neither this Court, nor the court of 
appeals, had explicitly adopted the [sophisticated user] defense." The doctrine was 
clearly recognized in Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 550, 462 S.E.2d 321, 
332 (Ct. App. 1995), when the court of appeals "conclude[d] the trial court 
properly charged the jury concerning the sophisticated user defense."  
Nevertheless, I would modify Bragg in one respect. The jury charge approved in 
Bragg instructed the jury that manufacturers have no duty to warn of risks 
associated with a product when the product is to be distributed to a "learned 
intermediary" or sophisticated user. Id. at 549, 462 S.E.2d at 331. A similar 
charge was given in this case. See Lawing v. Trinity Mfg., Inc., 406 S.C. 13, 32, 
749 S.E.2d 126, 136 (Ct. App. 2013).  However, contrary to the jury charges in 
Bragg and in this case, the sophisticated user doctrine does not negate the 
existence of a duty on the part of the manufacturer.  As the court of appeals 
correctly observed, "the sophisticated user doctrine does not operate to defeat any 
duty. It simply identifies circumstances the jury must consider when determining 
whether the supplier's duty to warn was breached."17 Id. at 28, 749 S.E.2d at 133. 
Second, I would not avoid the issue of the sophisticated user doctrine's existence 
and applicability by creating a distinction between the labeling and the use of the 
sodium bromate, as if the two are not related.  I view the issues of labeling and use 
as inextricably connected in this case.  It is undisputed that Trinity Manufacturing 
and Matrix Outsourcing knew that Engelhard employees would be in close 
proximity to the sodium bromate, working with or around the dangerous product.  
While acknowledging "Engelhard was very familiar with sodium bromate and 
understood its dangerous nature," the Court states that "Engelhard's knowledge of 
the dangers of sodium bromate does not affect the suppliers' duty to properly label 
17 The court of appeals did not address, and properly so in my judgment, the effect 
of this erroneous jury instruction in this case because it was not preserved for 
appellate review. Id. at 32, 749 S.E.2d at 136. 
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sodium bromate as a hazardous and flammable product."  I believe Engelhard's 
knowledge of the dangers of sodium bromate is at the heart of the sophisticated 
user defense. Engelhard's knowledge of those dangers is a critical factor in 
assessing "'whether the supplier . . . acted reasonably in assuming that the 
intermediary would recognize the danger and take precautions to protect its 
employees.'"  Bragg, 319 S.C. at 550, 462 S.E.2d at 332 (quoting O'Neal v. 
Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 253 n.2 (4th Cir. 1993)). Again, I refer to the court 
of appeals' opinion:
Considered as a whole, this evidence supports the trial court's decision 
to charge the jury on the sophisticated user doctrine.  It shows Trinity 
and Matrix knew Engelhard used large quantities of sodium bromate 
and had tested samples of the product in its laboratory before deciding 
to buy it. It also shows that employees of Matrix, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Trinity, and Univar, the company to which Trinity 
directly sold the sodium bromate, believed Engelhard had a safety 
program that ensured employees were adequately informed of the 
dangers of the chemicals in the facility.  Finally, it shows Trinity and 
Matrix knew about the MSDS and that Engelhard received it.  A jury 
could infer from this evidence that Trinity and Matrix acted 
reasonably in providing warnings on the bags and in the MSDS, 
relying on Engelhard to provide its employees any additional 
warnings about the dangers of sodium bromate. 
Lawing, 406 S.C. at 31–32, 749 S.E.2d at 135–36.  I would affirm the court of 
appeals with respect to the sophisticated user doctrine. 
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JUSTICE PLEICONES:  I respectfully dissent. I agree with Justice Kittredge 
that the Court of Appeals properly decided the "sophisticated user" issue, and that 
the doctrine has been part of South Carolina's jurisprudence since 1995.  I disagree 
with the majority, with Justice Kittredge, and with the Court of Appeals, however, 
on the question whether Lawing was a 'user' within the meaning of S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 15-73-10 (2005), and would therefore uphold the trial court's decision to grant 
summary judgment to Trinity and Matrix on Lawing's strict liability claim.   
Section 15-73-10 imposes strict liability on sellers to users and consumers under 
certain circumstances.  The meaning of the terms "user" and" consumer" are 
elucidated by the Comments to § 402A of the Restatement of Torts Second.18
Comment l provides: ""User" includes those who are passively enjoying the benefit 
of the product . . . as well as those who are utilizing it for the purpose of doing 
work upon it . . . ." At the time of this horrific accident, the sodium bromate was 
being stored, albeit in an improper location, "until it was needed for production."  
Lawing v. Univar, USA, Inc., supra at p. _____. Moreover, the accident occurred 
during "shutdown week" when no "regular production" took place.  Id. Given 
these circumstances, I would find that Lawing was not a 'user' within the meaning 
of § 15-73-10 when the fire occurred, because at that juncture neither he nor 
Engelhard was "utilizing [the sodium bromate] for the purpose of doing work upon 
it" within the meaning or contemplation of Comment l. 
This is a tragic case, but for the reasons given above, I respectfully dissent, and 
would affirm the Court of Appeals on the "sophisticated user" issue, and reverse 
that court on the "user within the meaning of § 15-73-10" issue and reinstate the 
trial court's order granting summary judgment to Trinity and Matrix. 
18 Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-73-30 (2005), these comments are incorporated 
by reference and are deemed to express the General Assembly's legislative intent. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Supreme Court 
The State, Respondent, 
v. 

Alton Wesley Gore, Jr., Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2014-001496 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 

APPEALS

Appeal from Horry County 

 Edward B. Cottingham, Special Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27595 

Heard October 21, 2015 – Filed December 2, 2015 

CERTIORARI DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY 

GRANTED 

Nicole Nicolette Mace and Amy Kristan Raffaldt, both of 
The Mace Law Firm, of Myrtle Beach, for Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 
Attorney General Christina Catoe Bigelow, both of 
Columbia, for Respondent.  
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PER CURIAM:  After careful consideration of the Appendix and briefs, the writ 
of certiorari is 
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Russell Warren Mace, III, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002418 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on 
incapacity inactive status pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). 
 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent is transferred to incapacity inactive status until 
further order of this Court. 
 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
 
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this order, respondent shall serve and file the 
affidavit required by Rule 30, RLDE.  Should respondent fail to timely file the 
required affidavit, respondent may be held in civil and/or criminal contempt of this 
Court as provided by Rule 30, RLDE. 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 FOR THE COURT 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
November 30, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Thomas P. and Desiree J. Lyons, Respondents, 
v. 
Fidelity National Title Insurance Company as successor 
by merger to Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 
Bobby Gene Martin, and The Security Title Guarantee 
Corporation of Baltimore, Defendants, 
Of whom The Security Title Guarantee Corporation of 
Baltimore is the Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-002137 
Appeal From Horry County 

Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5365 

Heard November 3, 2014 – Filed December 2, 2015 

 AFFIRMED 
Ray Coit Yarborough Jr., of Florence, for Appellant. 
David K. Haller, of Haller Law Firm, of Charleston, for 
Respondents. 
MCDONALD, J.:  The Security Title Guarantee Corporation of Baltimore 
(Security Title) appeals the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment in 
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favor of Thomas P. Lyons and Desiree J. Lyons (collectively, the Lyons).  Security 
Title argues the circuit court erred in (1) finding the Lyons' claims were not barred 
by the statute of limitations; (2) holding a county "no-build" resolution appeared in 
the public record and was available for title examination when the policy was 
issued; (3) holding a zoning resolution imposing a land restriction was a defect in 
title triggering coverage under the policy; (4) finding the Lyons did not fail to 
mitigate their damages; and (5) determining the date of loss.  We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The real property (the Property) at issue is a residential lot located in Horry 
County, which previously held a mobile home with numerous extensions and 
additions.  Unbeknownst to the Lyons at the time of their purchase, the Property 
had been encumbered since 1932 by a properly recorded easement allowing for the 
construction and maintenance of the Intracoastal Waterway.  Moreover, the 
Property has been subject to a county "no-build" resolution since 2003.  
The Lyons purchased the Property in two separate transactions.  On May 5, 2005, 
they purchased a lot (Lot 1) for $240,000, along with a title insurance policy from
Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation (Lawyers Title).1  On October 28, 2005, the 
Lyons purchased a portion of a lot (Lot 2) adjacent to Lot 1 for $100,000. In 
conjunction with this transaction, they purchased a title insurance policy from
Security Title.2  Lots 1 and 2 were subsequently combined into the Property at 
issue, which is shown as "Lot 1" on a plat dated August 24, 2005, and recorded 
with the Horry County Register of Deeds.  
On July 3, 1930, Congress enacted the River and Harbor Act, which provided for 
the construction of the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway.3 In 1931, our General 
1 Fidelity National Title Insurance Company is the successor by merger to Lawyers 
Title. Fidelity is a defendant in the underlying action but is not a party to this 
appeal. 
2 The title insurance policies are substantially identical. 
3 See River and Harbor Act, ch. 847, § 2, 46 Stat. 945 (1930) (current version at 33 
U.S.C. § 426 (2001)).
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Assembly passed an act to provide for rights-of-way for the construction project.4
On August 17, 1932, the governor executed a deed to rights of way (Spoil
Easement), which granted the federal government the following:
[T]he perpetual right and easement to enter upon, 
excavate, cut away and remove any and all of the tracts 
hereinafter described as composing a part of the canal 
prism,[5] as may be required at any time for construction 
and maintenance of the said Inland Waterway . . . and . . . 
to enter upon, occupy, and use any portion of . . . the 
spoil disposal area[6] . . . [and] to deposit on the . . . spoil 
disposal area, or any portion thereof, any and all spoil or 
other material excavated in construction and maintenance 
of the aforesaid waterway and its appurtenances. 
The Spoil Easement was filed in the Horry County Register of Deeds on 
September 17, 1932.
In 1983, the Army Corps of Engineers began managing the Spoil Easement.  Horry 
County's obligations were established in a tri-party agreement dated December 8, 
1982. On or about November 4, 2003, the Horry County Council adopted 
Resolution R-143-03 (the no-build resolution), providing that,  
Horry County Council resolved to authorize the issuance 
of building permits to repair, remodel or replace existing 
structures within the spoil easements along the 
Intracoastal Waterway, but to otherwise continue the 
policy of denying building permits in this area.  Mobile 
homes within the spoil area may only be replaced with 
mobile homes.   
4 See Act No. 163, 1931 S.C. Acts 225–26 (current version at S.C. Code Ann. § 3-
5-20 (1986)). 

5 The Property abuts the Intracoastal Waterway and is part of the canal prism. 
 
6 The Property is part of the spoil disposal area.  
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Horry County Res. 143-03. In May 2011, Horry County refused to issue the Lyons 
a building permit due to the no-build resolution. The Lyons assert that when their 
building permit was refused, "they learn[ed] for the first time that there is an 
easement on the property[,] which essentially makes their property useless."  
Thereafter, they removed the existing mobile home structure from the Property and 
listed the Property for sale for $539,000. 
The Lyons subsequently submitted claims against Fidelity and Security Title under 
their title insurance policies. On October 11, 2011, Security Title denied the 
Lyons' claim and rejected their $80,000 demand.  The Lyons filed an action for 
breach of contract and bad faith failure to pay insurance claims on July 5, 2012, 
followed by an amended summons and complaint on July 19, 2012. The Lyons 
subsequently moved for partial summary judgment on December 20, 2012.  
At the May 15, 2013 summary judgment hearing, the Lyons brought to the circuit 
court's attention that United States District Court Judge R. Bryan Harwell had 
granted partial summary judgment for a neighboring insured on the liability 
question in a similar case.  See Whitlock v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 2011 WL 
4549367 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2011).7  The circuit court granted the Lyons' motion for 
partial summary judgment by order filed July 12, 2013.  Security Title moved to 
reconsider on July 26, 2013; the circuit court denied the motion to reconsider on 
August 9, 2013. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"An appellate court reviews the granting of summary judgment under the same
standard applied by the [circuit] court under Rule 56, SCRCP."  Wachovia Bank, 
N.A. v. Coffey, 404 S.C. 421, 425, 746 S.E.2d 35, 37 (2013) (quoting Quail Hill, 
LLC v. Cty. of Richland, 387 S.C. 223, 235, 692 S.E.2d 499, 505 (2010)).  The 
circuit court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
7 The question of the applicable date for establishing the measure of damages was 
certified to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which concluded that when "faced 
with the task of construing an insurance policy, and in the presence of an 
ambiguity we are constrained to interpret it most favorably to the insured.  In this 
case, the date the property was purchased is the proper valuation date."  Whitlock v. 
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 399 S.C. 610, 616, 732 S.E.2d 626, 629 (2012).   
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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Rule 56(c), 
SCRCP. "In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and 
all inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party."  Wachovia Bank, 404 S.C. at 425, 
746 S.E.2d at 38 (quoting Quail Hill, 387 S.C. at 235, 692 S.E.2d at 505). 
"Summary judgment should not be granted even when there is no dispute as to 
evidentiary facts if there is dispute as to the conclusion to be drawn from those 
facts." Quail Hill, 387 S.C. at 235, 692 S.E.2d at 505 (quoting Brockbank v. Best 
Capital Corp., 341 S.C. 372, 378, 534 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2000)).
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Statute of Limitations 
Security Title argues that the "mere affixation of a corporate seal" does not make 
the title policy a "sealed instrument;" thus, the three-year statute of limitations 
applies to bar the Lyons' claims.  We disagree. 
"Statutes of limitations embody important public policy considerations in that they 
stimulate activity, punish negligence, and promote repose by giving security and 
stability to human affairs." Moates v. Bobb, 322 S.C. 172, 176, 470 S.E.2d 402, 
404 (Ct. App. 1996). "One purpose of a statute of limitations is 'to relieve the 
courts of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights.'"
Id. (quoting McKinney v. CSX Transp., Inc., 298 S.C. 47, 49–50, 378 S.E.2d 69, 70 
(Ct. App. 1989)). "Another purpose of the statute of limitations is to protect 
potential defendants from protracted fear of litigation."  Id. "The cornerstone 
policy consideration underlying statutes of limitations is the laudable goal of law to 
promote and achieve finality in litigation."  Carolina Marine Handling, Inc. v. 
Lasch, 363 S.C. 169, 175, 609 S.E.2d 548, 552 (Ct. App. 2005).  "Statutes of 
limitations are, indeed, fundamental to our judicial system."  Id. 
South Carolina Code section 15-3-530(1) provides for a three-year statute of 
limitations for "an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or 
implied, excepting those provided for in Section 15-3-520."  S.C. Code Ann. § 15-
5-530(1) (2005). Under the discovery rule, "the statute of limitations begins to run 
when a cause of action reasonably ought to have been discovered.  The statute runs 
from the date the injured party either knows or should have known by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence that a cause of action arises from the wrongful conduct."  
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Dean v. Ruscon Corp., 321 S.C. 360, 363, 468 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1996).  "The 
discovery rule applies to breach of contract actions."  Prince v. Liberty Life Ins. 
Co., 390 S.C. 166, 169, 700 S.E.2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 2010).  "Pursuant to the 
discovery rule, a breach of contract action accrues not on the date of the breach, 
but rather on the date the aggrieved party either discovered the breach, or could or 
should have discovered the breach through the exercise of reasonable diligence."  
Maher v. Tietex Corp., 331 S.C. 371, 377, 500 S.E.2d 204, 207 (Ct. App. 1998).
The Lyons asserted below that when their building permit was refused in May 
2011, "they learn[ed] for the first time that there is an easement on the property[,]
which essentially makes their property useless."  However, the circuit court ruled 
there was evidence that the Lyons knew or should have known of the Spoil 
Easement as early as October 26, 2006, when they received a letter from the Army
Corps of Engineers informing them of a disposal easement held by the United 
States on or adjacent to the area where they planned to construct a dock.  The 
Lyons had previously received a substantively identical letter dated March 19, 
2006. 
South Carolina Code section 15-3-520(b) provides for a twenty-year statute of 
limitations for "an action upon a sealed instrument, other than a sealed note and 
personal bond for the payment of money only whereon the period of limitation is 
the same as prescribed in Section 15-3-530."  S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-520(b) 
(2005). "We adhere to our general three-year statute of limitations for most 
contract actions and acknowledge the availability of the twenty-year limitations 
period where the contract clearly evidences an intent to create a sealed instrument."
Carolina Marine, 363 S.C. at 175, 609 S.E.2d at 552.  We acknowledge that South 
Carolina has not specifically considered whether an insurance policy containing a 
seal is a sealed instrument under section 15-3-520(b).   
A sealed instrument is defined as "an instrument to which the bound party has 
affixed a personal seal, [usually] recognized as providing indisputable evidence of 
the validity of the underlying obligations." Sealed Instrument, BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2010). A seal is defined as "an impression or sign that has 
legal consequences when applied to an instrument."  Id.; see also 68 Am. Jur. 2d 
Seals § 6 (2014) ("Devices or impressions held to be seals include . . . a printed 
impression of a seal.").  The prevailing view is that "the seal may consist of any 
substance affixed to the document or the use of an impression such as that 
customarily used by notaries and corporations, or the use of any other mark, work, 
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symbol, scrawl, or sign intended to operate as a seal."  1 WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 2:4 (2007). 
For purposes unrelated to the applicable statute of limitations, our supreme court 
addressed whether a particular deed was a sealed instrument in Cook v. Cooper, 59 
S.C. 560, 38 S.E. 218 (1901). The deed at issue in Cook lacked a seal "upon its 
face."  Id. at 562, 38 S.E. at 219. However, it presented the following features:  (1) 
an attestation clause; (2) the word "seal" was adjacent to the grantor's signature; 
and (3) the deed concluded with "Signed, Sealed and Delivered in the [presence] of 
[names of witnesses]."  Id.  The Cook court, relying in part on the predecessor to 
section 19-1-160, found that the parties intended to create a sealed instrument.  Id.
In Stelts v. Martin, 90 S.C. 14, 72 S.E. 550 (1911), the court addressed the statute 
of limitations applicable in a foreclosure action.  In Stelts, the validity of a 
mortgage was at stake. Our supreme court explained the following:
We are unable to agree with the Circuit Judge that a 
paper, in form a mortgage and lacking a witness or a seal 
or other formal requisite of a legal mortgage, but valid 
between the parties as an equitable mortgage, is barred 
by the statute of limitations six years after its maturity. 
The paper is . . . a sealed instrument importing an 
obligation to pay money and a lien as between the 
obligor and obligee upon the land to secure payment. 
This being so . . . the [action falls] under [the predecessor 
to code section 19-1-160,] providing a limitation of 
twenty years . . . . 
Id. at 17, 72 S.E. 551–52 (emphasis added).   
In South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Winyah Nursing Homes, Inc., 
this court concluded that although the contract at issue did not include a seal, the 
language of the contract manifested the parties' intent to create a sealed instrument.  
282 S.C. 556, 561, 320 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 1984).  "The attestation clauses 
state that 'the parties hereto have set their hands and seals.' The notation 'L.S.'
follows the signatures of the agents for both DSS and the Nursing Home." Id.
"L.S. is an abbreviation for locus sigilli, which means 'the place of the seal; the 
place occupied by the seal of written instruments.'  L.S. usually appears on 
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documents in place of, and serves the same purpose as, a seal." Carolina Marine, 
363 S.C. at 174, 609 S.E.2d at 551 (citing Locus Sigilli, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(6th ed. 1990)).
Likewise, in Treadaway v. Smith, this court found the parties to a separation 
agreement (incorporated into a 1974 Haitian divorce) intended to create a sealed 
instrument. 325 S.C. 367, 378, 479 S.E.2d 849, 855 (Ct. App. 1996), abrogated by
Carolina Marine Handling, Inc. v. Lasch, 363 S.C. 169, 609 S.E.2d 548 (Ct. App. 
2005). The parties' agreement stated, "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have 
hereunto set their respective Hands and Seals in quadruplicate as of the day and 
year first above written" and "SIGNED SEALED AND DELIVERED IN THE 
PRESENCE OF [signatures of parties and witnesses]."  Id.  This court concluded 
that the plaintiff's action, which sought to enforce a provision of the agreement in 
which the defendant agreed to pay the children's college expenses, was governed 
by the twenty-year statute of limitations.  Id.
However, in Carolina Marine, this court concluded that the sophisticated parties to 
a commercial lease agreement did not intend to create a sealed instrument.  363 
S.C. at 174, 609 S.E.2d at 551. Thus, the lease at issue was not sealed, and the 
general three-year statute of limitations applied to the tenant's counterclaim for 
breach of contract against a subtenant. Id.  Although the lease contained an 
attestation clause reading "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set 
their hands and seals," the lease did not contain an actual seal, the letters "L.S.," 
referring to the place where a seal would be affixed, or such a phrase as "signed, 
sealed, and delivered."  Id. at 174–75, 609 S.E.2d at 551–52.  This court cautioned, 
"Were we to construe this boilerplate attestation clause, by itself, as requiring a 
finding of intent to create a sealed instrument in an otherwise non-sealed 
instrument, we would likely transform the twenty-year statute of limitations into 
the standard period of limitations for contract actions in this state."  Id. 
In the present case, we find Security Title's residential title insurance policy 
includes a seal "upon its face."  The seal states "THE SECURITY TITLE 
GUARANTEE CORPORATION OF BALTIMORE, Incorporated 1952 
Baltimore." In both Cook and Stelts, our supreme court implied that if the 
document at issue had a seal "upon its face," the court would not have needed to 
determine whether the parties intended to create a sealed instrument.  Moreover, 
this court found the inclusion of "L.S." to be significant in Winyah. 
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Security Title argues that the purpose of the seal is "to show that it is the act of the 
corporation . . . [and] that the company's agent is authorized to complete the policy 
schedules to make the Policy valid." It asserts that the "mere affixation of a 
corporate seal" does not make the policy a "sealed instrument," citing Central 
National Bank of Columbia v. Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta Railroad Co., 5 
S.C. 156, 158 (1874) (explaining that the seal of corporation is not, in itself, 
conclusive of an intent to make a specialty as it is equally appropriate as means of 
evidencing the assent of a corporation to be bound by a simple contract as by a 
specialty), in support of its position.
In Republic Contracting Corp. v. South Carolina Department of Highways & 
Public Transportation, this court concluded that a statute requiring an engineer to 
place his professional engineer's seal and endorsement on bridge plans did not 
render the plans a "sealed instrument" triggering the application of the twenty-year 
statute of limitations.  332 S.C. 197, 205–06, 503 S.E.2d 761, 766 (Ct. App. 1998); 
see S.C. Code Ann. § 40-22-370(3), (4), and (6) (Supp. 1997) (requiring plans 
prepared by a registered engineer to include the engineer's seal and endorsement 
when filed with public authorities and when issued for use as job site record 
documents). Moreover, nothing in the statute "lead[s] to the inference that a 
purpose of the mandate for affixing a seal and an endorsement is to extend the time
in which an action can be brought concerning a document on which these items
appear." Republic Contracting, 332 S.C. at 205–06, 503 S.E.2d at 766; see also 
Landmark Eng'g, Inc. v. Cooper, 476 S.E.2d 63, 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) 
(explaining that a surveyor's seal ensures responsibility for his work but does not 
create a twenty-year statute of limitations prescribed for documents under seal). 
The same cannot be said under the unique circumstances of this case.  There is no 
statutory requirement that a title insurance company place its corporate seal and 
endorsement on a policy; this alone distinguishes the seal in this case from the 
engineer's seal in Republic. The court is bound by the rules of contract 
construction requiring that insurance policies be construed against the drafter and 
in favor of coverage. Therefore, we find the presence of the seal on the face of the 
policy, next to the president's signature, evidences an intent to create a sealed 
instrument. 
Moreover, the purpose of residential title policies—the protection of homeowners 
from unknown title defects—lends additional support to this result.  The Lyons 
purchased the Property with the intent to build their retirement home upon it.  The 
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standard terms for a residential note and mortgage are fifteen to thirty years.  A 
twenty-year statute of limitations allows policyholders to carefully monitor 
situations as they unfold, ultimately preventing the bringing of unnecessary claims
or litigation. Thus, we agree with the circuit court that "the policies are indeed 
sealed instruments and that the twenty-year statute of limitations applies." 
II. Governmental Police Power Exclusion   
Security Title further asserts the circuit court erred in granting the Lyons partial 
summary judgment because the title policy's "governmental police power" 
exclusion (Exclusion 1) excludes coverage as a matter of law.  We disagree. 
Insurance policies are subject to the general rules of 
contract construction. The cardinal rule of contract 
interpretation is to ascertain and give legal effect to the 
parties' intentions as determined by the contract 
language. Courts must enforce, not write, contracts of 
insurance, and their language must be given its plain, 
ordinary and popular meaning.  
Where the contract's language is clear and unambiguous, 
the language alone determines the contract's force and 
effect. It is a question of law for the court whether the 
language of a contract is ambiguous.  Ambiguous or 
conflicting terms in an insurance policy must be 
construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly 
against the insurer. 
Whitlock, 399 S.C. at 614–15, 732 S.E.2d at 628 (citations omitted). 
Insurance policy exclusions are construed "most strongly against the insurance 
company, which also bears the burden of establishing the exclusion's 
applicability." Owners Ins. Co. v. Clayton, 364 S.C. 555, 560, 614 S.E.2d 611, 614 
(2005). This rule applies to title insurance contracts. First Carolinas Joint Stock 
Land Bank of Columbia v. N.Y. Title, 172 S.C. 435, 445, 174 S.E. 402, 406 (1934).  
"Generally, title insurance operates to protect a purchaser or mortgagee against 
defects in or encumbrances on title which are in existence at the time the insured 
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 takes title." Firstland Vill. Assocs. v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Co., 277 S.C. 184, 186, 
284 S.E.2d 582, 583 (1981). 
In this case, Exclusion 1 states the following: 
In addition to the Exceptions in Schedule B, you are not 
insured against loss, costs, attorneys' fees, and expenses 
resulting from: 
1. Governmental police power, and the existence or 
violation of any law or government regulation.  This 
includes building and zoning ordinances and also laws 
and regulations concerning: 
 
 land use 

 improvements on the land 

 land division 

 environmental protection 

This exclusion does not apply to violations or the 
enforcement of these matters which appear in the 
public records at Policy Date. 
This exclusion does not limit the zoning coverage 
described in Items 12 and 13 of the Covered Title 
Risks. 
The "Covered Title Risks" section of the policy provides that the policy covers 
certain listed title risks if the listed risk affects title on the policy date.  The 
Covered Title Risks include but are not limited to the following: 
10. Someone else has an easement on your land. 
. . . . 
13. You cannot use the land because use as a single-
family residence violates a restriction shown in Schedule 
B or an existing zoning law.  
14. Other defects, liens, or encumbrances. 
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Security Title contends the county's no-build resolution—prohibiting the issuance 
of building permits on property located in the Spoil Easement—was neither in the 
"public record" as defined by the policy nor available for title examination on the 
date the policy was issued.  Thus, according to Security Title, coverage is excluded 
by the "governmental police power" provision of Exclusion 1. We disagree.
The title policy defines "public records" as "title records that give constructive 
notice of matters affecting your title—according to the state statutes where your 
land is located." As to such public records, section 30-7-10 provides, in pertinent 
part: 
[G]enerally all instruments in writing conveying an 
interest in real estate required by law to be recorded in 
the office of the register of deeds . . . are valid so as to 
affect the rights of subsequent creditors (whether lien 
creditors or simple contract creditors), or purchasers for 
valuable consideration without notice, only from the day 
and hour when they are recorded in the office of the 
register of deeds . . . of the county in which the real 
property affected is situated.  
S.C. Code Ann. § 30-7-10 (1976); see also Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. Richland 
Cty., 394 S.C. 154, 169, 714 S.E.2d 869, 876 (2011) (explaining that zoning 
designations are part of the public record). 
It is the Lyons' position that a government regulation is inherently a public record 
and that, as a result, Exclusion 1 is inapplicable.  After considering the purpose of 
the title policy, the circuit court construed the term "public record" against Security 
Title because the term "public record" may be fairly and reasonably understood in 
more than one way.  See Farr v. Duke Power Co., 265 S.C. 356, 362, 281 S.E.2d 
431, 433 (1975) ("A contract is ambiguous only when it may fairly and reasonably 
be understood in more ways than one.").   
In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court referenced the South Carolina district 
court's opinion considering "the same spoils easement, no-build resolution, and 
title insurance policy language."  See Whitlock, 2011 WL 4549367 at *2–4. We, 
like the circuit court, find the district court's reasoning logical and its conclusion 
persuasive. See Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Homestead Indus., Inc., 318 S.C. 231, 
236, 456 S.E.2d 912, 915 (1995) (stating that ambiguities are construed against the 
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insurer); Phillips v. Periodical Publishers' Serv. Bureau, Inc., 300 S.C. 444, 446, 
388 S.E.2d 787, 789 (1989) (explaining that although a district court's decision is 
not binding, it is nevertheless persuasive authority).
The title policy provides broad coverage for title problems created by laws and 
regulations addressing land use and improvements on land. Because Security Title 
drafted the contract, it could easily have defined the term "public record" to 
exclude zoning laws and regulations or drafted other exclusionary language.  Like 
the circuit court and district court, we find the term "public record" to be 
ambiguous as defined in the policy.  Thus, we hold the circuit court properly 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of coverage because the Spoil 
Easement and no-build resolution were public records not located during the title 
search. 
III. Zoning Regulation as Land Use Restriction Triggering Coverage 
The parties dispute whether a mobile home, which would be permitted on the 
Property, is a "single-family residence" as the term is used in the policy, and 
whether the zoning regulation preventing construction of the site-built house the 
Lyons intended to construct on the Property triggers title coverage.  It is 
undisputed that a mobile home with numerous extensions and additions was 
previously located on the Property. It is also undisputed that due to the no-build 
resolution, Horry County will not permit the Lyons to construct a "site-built" 
home. 
Security Title concedes that its policy does not define "single-family residence" but 
argues that the "General Assembly implicitly recognizes that mobile homes are 
ordinarily used as single-family residences."  See S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-210(14) 
(2007) (defining "single family residence" as "a structure maintained and used as a 
single dwelling unit"); S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-210(3) (2007) (defining "dwelling 
unit" to include landlord-owned mobile homes).  Here, Exclusion 1 "does not limit 
the zoning coverage described in Items 12 and 13 of Covered Title Risks."  
"Covered Title Risks" item 13 states that the policy provides coverage if "[one] 
cannot use the land because use as a single-family residence violates a restriction 
shown in Schedule B or an existing zoning law."  The circuit court concluded that, 
like "public record," the term "single-family residence" is ambiguous.  Therefore, 
the circuit court construed the term in favor of the Lyons and found that "Covered 
Title Risks" item 13 provided coverage because the Lyons "cannot use [the 
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Property] as a single-family residence due to the existing zoning law preventing 
them from building a site-built home."  
Our review of the record reveals that the term "single-family residence" is not 
defined by the policy. As this term's precise meaning is unclear, we find the circuit 
court properly construed the policy against the drafter so as not to include a mobile 
home.  Thus, Exclusion 1 does not bar coverage because the Lyons cannot use the 
Property for a "single-family residence."  See Diamond, 318 S.C. at 236, 456 
S.E.2d at 915 (stating that ambiguities are construed against the insurer).  
Therefore, we hold the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment as to 
this issue.
IV. Mitigation of Damages 
Security Title argues the circuit court erred in determining that the Lyons did not 
fail to mitigate their damages. 
"A party injured by the acts of another is required to do those things a person of 
ordinary prudence would do under the circumstances, but the law does not require 
him to exert himself unreasonably or incur substantial expense to avoid damages."  
Baril v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., 352 S.C. 271, 285, 573 S.E.2d 830, 838 (Ct. App. 
2002); see also Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 480, 90 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1955) 
("It is the undoubted general rule that it is the duty of the owner of the property, 
which is injured by the negligence of another, to use reasonable means to minimize 
the damages."). "The duty to mitigate losses applies to contracts."  Cisson Constr.,
Inc. v. Reynolds & Assocs., Inc., 311 S.C. 499, 503, 429 S.E.2d 847, 849 (Ct. App. 
1993). "Whether the party acted reasonably to mitigate damages is ordinarily a 
question for the jury." Baril, 352 S.C. at 285, 573 S.E.2d at 838. 
A defendant who claims a plaintiff's damages could have been mitigated has the 
burden of proving that mitigation is possible and reasonable.  Moore v. Moore, 360 
S.C. 241, 262, 599 S.E.2d 467, 478 (Ct. App. 2004).  "Moreover, the party who 
claims damages should have been minimized has the burden of proving they could 
reasonably have been avoided or reduced." Id. (quoting Chastain v. Owens 
Carolina, Inc., 310 S.C. 417, 420, 426 S.E.2d 834, 835 (Ct. App. 1993)).  The 
reasonableness of a party's actions to mitigate damages is a question of fact which 
cannot be decided as a matter of law when conflicting evidence is presented.  
Chastain, 310 S.C. at 420, 426 S.E.2d at 836; Hinton v. Designer Ensembles, Inc., 
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 335 S.C. 305, 320, 516 S.E.2d 665, 672 (Ct. App.1999), overruled on other 
grounds by 343 S.C. 236, 246, 540 S.E.2d 94, 99 (2000). 
The "Limitation of Company's Liability" section of the policy provides in part:  
a.	 We will pay up to your actual loss or the Policy 
Amount in force when the claim is made --
whichever is less. 
 
. . . . 
 
e. 	 If you do anything to affect any right of recovery 
you may have, we can subtract from our liability 
the amount by which you reduced the value of that 
right. 
A. Offer to Purchase Subject Property 
Security Title argues the Lyons failed to mitigate their damages when they rejected 
an offer to purchase the Property.  We disagree.  
In his deposition, Mr. Lyons testified that he "thinks" he was offered $475,000 for 
the Property in September 2006.  Security Title contends that "[h]ad the Lyons 
accepted the offer, they would not only have recouped their initial investment but 
would have reaped a profit from the sale." Security Title further contends that the 
circuit court should have let a jury determine "the amount of damages, or lack 
thereof as a consequence of the Lyons' failure to mitigate."  The circuit court 
acknowledged the duty to mitigate, but cogently explained:  
[I]t cannot be said that after the discovery of an easement 
held by the United States that prevents construction of a 
dock, the law requires one to sell the entire property or be 
thwarted from bringing suit against his title insurance 
company at a later date; such a requirement would call 
for a party to exert himself unreasonably. 
We agree with the circuit court that the Lyons did not fail to mitigate their 
damages.  See Baril, 352 S.C. at 285, 573 S.E.2d at 838 (explaining that the law 
does not require an injured party "to exert himself unreasonably or incur 
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substantial expense to avoid damages").  Moreover, we find that Security Title's
argument fails given that the Lyons could not have provided a potential purchaser 
with clean title to the Property because the Spoil Easement is properly recorded.   
B. Demolition of Mobile Home 
Security Title further contends that the Lyons failed to mitigate their losses when 
they demolished the mobile home previously located on the Property.  We 
disagree. 
Although Security Title raised this argument in its Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider, 
it did not raise this issue to the circuit court at the hearing on the Lyons' motion for 
summary judgment or by way of written opposition.  Thus, this issue is not 
preserved for appellate review. See Kiawah Prop. Owners Grp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n of S.C., 359 S.C. 105, 113, 597 S.E.2d 145, 149 (2004) (finding an issue 
not preserved because "a party may not raise an issue in a motion to reconsider, 
alter, or amend a judgment that could have been presented prior to the judgment").   
V. Date of Loss 
The circuit court determined that damages "are to be calculated based on the 
diminution in value caused by the title defects, measured from the date the 
property was purchased." Security Title contests this, arguing that any loss 
(diminution in value) should be calculated based on the value of the lot when 
Security Title received the Lyons' claim.
The circuit court further held, however, that summary judgment was not 
appropriate as to damages "[b]ecause the amount of diminution of value is a 
genuine issue of material fact . . . [and f]urther hearings will be necessary to 
establish the amount of damages." See Stanley v. Atl. Title Ins. Co., 377 S.C. 405, 
411–12, 661 S.E.2d 62, 65–66 (2008).  Because the circuit court denied the Lyons'
motion for summary judgment as to damages,8 we find this issue is not properly 
before this court. See Ballenger v. Bowen, 313 S.C. 476, 477, 443 S.E.2d 379, 380 
8 The circuit court also declined to accept the Lyons' argument that the title policies 
insure their loss to the full value of the policies, explaining that the "spoilage 
easement and no-build resolution have not rendered the property useless or 
completely unmarketable." 
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(1994) (explaining that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not 
immediately appealable because it does not finally determine anything about the 
merits or strike a defense); Kinard v. Richardson, 407 S.C. 247, 263–64, 754 
S.E.2d 888, 897 (Ct. App. 2014) ("[T]he denial of a motion for summary judgment 
is not appealable, even after final judgment." (quoting Olson v. Faculty House of 
Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 161, 168, 580 S.E.2d 440, 444 (2003))).9
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the circuit court properly found that (1) the 
Lyons' claims were not barred by the statute of limitation, (2) Exclusion 1 does not 
bar coverage, and (3) the Lyons did not fail to mitigate their damages.  
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court granting partial summary judgment is 
AFFIRMED. 
WILLIAMS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
9 In any event, as noted above, our supreme court's ruling on the certified question 
in Whitlock is likely determinative of this question.  See 399 S.C. at 616, 732 
S.E.2d at 629 (holding that, in the presence of the policy's ambiguity, it was 
constrained to interpret the provision "most favorably to the insured.  In this case, 
the date the property was purchased is the proper valuation date.").   
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